Free course: Functional Safety Basics on Udemy. The first 100 learners enrol free, until 7 December. Enrol now →

News

Research · Functional safety

Three models of automated vehicle certification in US states

Published 9 November 2026 · Source: arXiv

A white car fitted with roof-mounted sensors on a city street
Photo: Pexels

On 5 November 2026 a preprint titled "National and State-Level Approaches to Automated Vehicle Certification: A Comparative Framework for State Operational Governance", by Sk Nahia Ahsan, Md Abdullah Al Hasan, Danjue Chen and George List, was submitted to arXiv, the open preprint server.

The paper examines how states in the United States regulate automated driving systems at Levels 4 and 5 of driving automation, the levels defined by SAE International in SAE J3016. The abstract states that automated vehicle deployment in the United States is expanding without a unified federal certification framework, which leads to substantial variation in how states authorise and oversee testing and deployment.

The authors reviewed publicly available state statutes, administrative regulations, agency guidance and federal policy documents. They analysed ten states, chosen to cover the range of regulatory approaches, under four headings: operational scope, governance and oversight, federal interaction, and implementation outcomes. They also reviewed certification practice in the European Union, China, Japan and Australia for comparison, and considered the implications of the findings for North Carolina's future regulatory strategy.

Why it matters

The paper identifies three state certification models, in order of increasing regulatory involvement:

  • Baseline legal compliance.
  • Administrative self-certification with ongoing oversight.
  • Permit-based authorisation, which requires formal agency review before deployment.

It places North Carolina's current approach in the first model.

The paper reports that international frameworks are converging on five elements: scenario-based testing, approval specific to an operational design domain (ODD), safety case documentation, cybersecurity assurance and oversight across the life cycle. It also states that these frameworks can only be transferred to the United States to a limited extent.

The paper notes that the models with greater regulatory involvement add operational governance, such as formal authorisation, incident response and conditions for suspension or revocation, rather than technical certification of the driving system. For automotive functional safety, two of the five converging international elements are safety case documentation and ODD-specific approval. The paper presents the three-model typology as a consistent basis for comparing the degree of regulatory involvement across states.

The paper is a preprint: arXiv does not peer review its postings, and the version described here is version 1.

Sources